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DEFORESTATION IN CAMBODIA AND MALAYSIA: THE
CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTION
Heather A. Wolf
Abstract: The logging of tropical timber for the export market is the primary
cause of deforestation in Southeast Asia. The problem of controlling the tropical timber
trade has been addressed on both the national and international level. The existing legal
mechanisms, however, have proven to be inadequate. A new multilateral agreement
based on the import and export permit system of the Basel Agreement is necessary to
control the timber trade and to aid in halting deforestation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The depletion of the world's tropical rain forests constitutes one of
the greatest crises facing the world today.I Deforestation results in massive
soil erosion, widespread flooding, climactic changes, disruption to agricul-
ture, loss of wildlife and the displacement of native peoples, 2 and forests are
disappearing faster in Southeast Asia than anywhere else.3 Many factors
account for the rapid deforestation including the need for fuel wood,
agricultural expansion, shifting cultivation, urbanization, and logging.4
Logging is the primary cause of deforestation in Southeast Asia.5
The main purpose of logging in Southeast Asia is to produce tropical timber
for the export market. 6 The Asia-Pacific region exports seventy percent of
its industrial wood,7 half of which goes to Japan and the rest goes to other
countries including Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. 8 These latter countries
re-process the logs and re-export them to North America, Africa, and the
Middle-East.9 In order to halt deforestation in Southeast Asia, the trade in
timber must be controlled. This Comment explores the ways in which the
I Khor Kok Peng, A Third World Perspective of the Forest Resources Crisis, in FOREST RESOURCES
CRISIS AND MANAGEMENT I I (vandana Shiva et al. eds.. 1992). See also Dennis D. Gray, New Battlefront
Tests Indochina, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, May 14, 1994, at A25. See generally ALAN T DURNING,
SAVING THE FORESTS: WHAT WILL IT TAKE? (1993).
2 Peng, supranote 1, at 13.
3 Peng, supra note 1, at 12.
4 Peng, supra note 1, at 12.
5 Peng, supra note 1, at 13.
6 Peng, supra note 1, at 14.
7 Peng, supra note 1, at 14.
8 Peng, supra note 1, at 14.
9 Peng, supra note 1, at 14.
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international community and countries within Southeast Asia have
attempted to deal with the regulation of the tropical timber trade.
Cambodia and Malaysia occupy opposite ends of the spectrum in the
ways in which Southeast Asian countries have managed their tropical
timber resources. Cambodia has sought to ban all exports of tropical timber
in an attempt to halt deforestation, '0 but its attempt has failed.l' Malaysia,
on the other hand, has fought to freely export tropical timber in spite of
international regulationl 2, and has been largely successful in combating
regulation efforts.13
First, this Comment will consider the problems of deforestation in
Cambodia and Malaysia. Next it will discuss the failure of existing legal
mechanisms to protect tropical timber. Unilateral efforts on the part of both
importing and exporting countries have failed in their efforts to restrict
trade. Cambodia's unilateral export ban did not succeed because of the
country's civil war and the lack of compliance on the part of importing
countries. The unilateral import ban proposals of Austria and the
Netherlands have been frustrated by countries such as Malaysia that do not
want their timber exports restricted. Additionally, this Comment will
discuss the failure of international legal efforts to protect tropical timber
including the International Tropical Timber Agreementl 4 ("ITTA") and the
Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species ("CITES"). 15
Finally, this Comment will propose a new tropical timber convention
based on the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 16 A multilateral
agreement is necessary because it overcomes obstacles created by the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 17 ("GATT") and because
10 Government Announces Ban on Log Exports as Part of Effort to Reduce Deforestation, BNA
INT'L ENVTL. DAILY, May 9, 1995, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED Database.
II See infra Part III.A. I discussing the failure of Cambodia's unilateral export ban.
12 See Brian F. Chase, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Legality of Unilateral Attempts to
Promote Sustainable Development Under the GAT 17 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 349, 376 (1994).
13 See, e.g., Malaysia Warns Swiss Not to Ban Tropical Wood Imports. JAPANECON, Mar. 9, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON Database.
14 International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan. 26, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1014 [hereinafter ITTA].
15 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973,
27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, ELR STAT. 40336 [hereinafter CITES].
16 The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, UN Doc. UNEP/1G.80/3, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) [hereinafter Basel
Convention].
17 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter text referred to as the GATT]. The GATT also refers to the institutional framework that
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individual countries cannot control the timber trade on their own. A new
multilateral agreement based on the import and export permit system of the
Basel Agreement provides a solution to the problem of regulating the
tropical timber trade in Southeast Asia.
II. THE PROBLEM OF DEFORESTATION IN CAMBODIA AND MALAYSIA
Deforestation is regarded as one of Southeast Asia's greatest
environmental problems. 18 Indochina's tropical forests have been heavily
impacted by decades of war and illegal logging. 19 Cambodia's forests once
covered seventy-three percent of the country in 1960 but now cover less
than forty percent of the country.20 Environmentalists predict that if
logging is not stopped, the country's forests will be completely destroyed
within five years.2 1
Deforestation in Cambodia has affected the country's irrigation
system, leading to floods, drought, and harvest failure.22 Many communi-
ties are running out of rice and face the threat of starvation.23 Additionally,
Tonle Sap Lake, which supplies most of the country's fish has been
adversely affected by logging that has allowed top soil to be washed down
into the lake. 24 Silt has reduced the lake's depth, causing it to flood more
often and thereby destroying crops.25 As a result of the logging, the
removal of tree roots has reduced the land's capacity to retain water and to
sustain crops.26
Malaysia, like Cambodia, has suffered intense deforestation. 27
Because industrialized countries such as Japan and South Korea provide
ready markets for Malaysian timber, Malaysian tropical forests are an easy
implements the GATT. GATT/WTO will refer to the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Negotiations, infra note 220.
18 Gray, supra note 1, at A25.
19 See Peng, supra note l, at 12.
20 See Gray, supra note 18.
21 Editorial, Chain Saw Massacre Levels Cambodia's Forests, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 18.
1995, at A83.
22 Susan Litherland, Environment-Cambodia: Forests Threatened by Cash-Seeking Khmer, INTER
PRESS SERV., Apr. 21, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
23 Id. According to the United Nations World Food Program, Cambodia can expect a shortage of
white rice of 90,000 metric tons for 1995.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Harrison Ngau et al., Malaysian Timber Exploitation for Whom? in FOREST RESOURCES CRISIS
AND MANAGEMENT 40 (Vandana Shiva et al. eds., 1992).
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source of wealth for those in power.28 Malaysian officials grant forest
concessions to timber companies that are either owned by politicians or
their relatives.29 The demand for timber resources has been a major impetus
towards a massive cutting of the nation's tropical rain forests. 30 Malaysia's
remaining timber reserves have been estimated to last only until the end of
the 1990S.31 The promotion of the export-oriented timber business has
necessitated the clearing of forests at the expense of cultivation and
production of food crops which meet local needs.32 The continuing
destruction of rain forests in Malaysia has adversely affected both the
natural environment of the country and the socio-economic development of
the indigenous people of Malaysia. 33
The effect of logging on native lands can be seen in the devastation
of the Malaysian timber-producing state of Sarawak, 34 which produces the
bulk of Malaysia's timber output. 35 In 1992, eleven million cubic meters of
Sarawak's permanent forests were logged.36 Environmentalists around the
world have taken up the plight of the native Penan tribe in Sarawak37
because rampant logging has been destructive to both the forests and liveli-
hoods of Sarawak's Penan people.38  Timber extraction has caused
extensive and irreparable damage to the natural land surface and vegeta-
tion,39 and logging has threatened the habitat of wild birds and animals,
depriving the local people of their hunting grounds. 40 Additionally, the
increase in sawmilling activities has caused widespread pollution to rivers
as floating logs and sawdust leach water soluble chemical compounds into
the water.4 1 These chemicals are often toxic and endanger the health of
native people who depend on the rivers for their drinking and domestic
28 Id. at 46.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 40.
31 Id.
32 Id at 47.
33 Id. at 41.
34 Evelyn Hong, Forest Destruction and the Plight of Sarawak's Natives in FOREST RESOURCES
CRISIS AND MANAGEMENT 192 (Vandana Shiva et al. eds., 1992).
35 Id.
36 Logging Cuts Cost Malaysian State 50 Million Dollars Yearly, JAPANECON, May 12, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON Database.
3 7 Malaysia Warns Swiss Not to Ban Tropical Wood Imports, JAPANECON, Mar. 9, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, JAPANECON Database.
38 See Logging Cuts Cost Malaysian State 50 Million Dollars Yearly, supra note 36.
39 See Hong, supra note 34, at 199.
40 See Hong, supra note 34, at 199.
41 See Hong, supra note 34, at 199.
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needs.42 Logging has also caused severe soil erosion resulting in flooding.
Floods have damaged native rice fields, crops, and livestock, resulting in
frequent food shortages for native peoples. 43
III. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING LEGAL MECHANISMS To PROTECT
TROPICAL TIMBER
A. National Efforts To Protect Tropical Timber
On the national level, unilateral trade restrictions have proven inef-
fective in controlling the tropical timber trade. Unilateral export bans have
failed, at least in part, because of the lack of compliance on the part of
importing countries such as Japan. 44 Unilateral import bans have failed due
to challenges by exporting countries, such as Malaysia, under the GA'I7.45
1. The Failure of Unilateral Export Bans in Cambodia
Unilateral export bans have been ineffective in stemming the defores-
tation in Cambodia and other Southeast Asian countries. Although every
country in Southeast Asia has implemented an export ban on tropical
timber,46 as of 1992, more than 700,000 hectares of forests are felled yearly
in the region.47 The failure of export.bans in Cambodia demonstrates the
inadequacy of unilateral efforts in stemming deforestation.
In November of 1992, the United Nations ("U.N.") Security Council
decided to ban all exports of Cambodian timber.48  The ban was
42 See Hong, supra note 34, at 199.
43 Hong, supra note 34, at 199-200.
44 See Boutros-Ghali Says Japan Breaking Cambodian Log Ban, JAPANECON, Feb. 12 1993,
available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON Database.
45 See Chase, supra note 12, at 374-79.
46 Even Malaysia has implemented an export ban. Initially, most of Peninsular Malaysia's trade was
in round wood. But, in order to encourage her developing domestic timber industry, Malaysia imposed
restraints on the export of round timber in 1977. Since this time, there had been a ban of log exports of
certain species and the list had grown to 27 species in 1983. Even with these export restrictions, the
volume of logs exported doubled, that of sawn timber and plywood tripled, and veneer exports rose ten
fold between 1970 and 1980. On balance, Malaysia's timber market has remained open to timber
consuming countries. Malaysia occupies an important place in the world export market for timber.
RACHEL BERGER, MALAYSIA'S FORESTS A RESOURCE WITHOUT A FUTURE? 83-91 (1990).
47 Suvendri Kakuchi, Asia: Illegal Timber Trade Costs Nations Billion-Dollar Losses, INTER PRESS
SERV., Dec. 2, 1992, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
48 At this time, the United Nations security council had responsibility for administering Cambodia
pursuant to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia ("UNTAC"). UNTAC took control of
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implemented on January 1, 1993, to cut off the Khmer Rouge's main source
of income in order to force them to abide by the U.N.-brokered peace
accord.49 The Khmer Rouge had refused to complete the disarmament and
demobilization provisions of the U.N-brokered accord and had refused to
participate in Cambodia's elections.50
The U.N. embargo proved largely ineffective. Both the Cambodian
government and the Khmer Rouge depended on money from the timber
trade to fund their respective armies in the country's civil war.51 The
Khmer Rouge has been fighting a guerrilla war against the Cambodian
government since Pol Pot's ouster from Phnom Penh in January of 1979.52
After Pol Pot's fall from leadership, the Khmer Rouge retreated to the hills
bordering Thailand53 and has since controlled most of the illegal tropical
timber trade. 54 The illegal timber trade includes the smuggling of timber
across the border into Thailand 55 and shipment of the illegal timber to
Japan. 56 During the first two months of 1993, Japan purchased 8000 cubic
meters of Cambodian logs were purchased in violation of the U.N.
embargo.57 This violation by the Japanese trading house, Mitsui and
the national defense and public security of Cambodia to ensure a neutral electoral environment. Japan
Pledges to Return Any Illegal Cambodian Logs, JAPANECON, Feb. 17 1993, available in WESTLAW,
JAPANECON Database.
49 Mitsui Violated Cambodian Timber Embargo, says UNTAC, JAPANECON, Feb. 16, 1993, available
in WESTLAW, JAPANECON Database.
50 Boutros-Ghali Says Japan Breaking Cambodian Log Ban, supra note 44.
51 See Litherland, supra note 22.
52 KHMER ROUGE ABUSES ALONG THE THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER 7 (Asia Watch Report 1989). The
Khmer Rouge seized power from the American-backed Lon Nol regime in April of 1975. With Pol Pot at
the helm of the government called the Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge declared a return to
"Year Zero" and started a campaign to rid Cambodia of all "corrupting influences." The purge resulted in
the execution of hundreds of thousands of civil servants, professionals, teachers, monks, peasants,
members of minority groups and others. Id. at 5.
53 In December of 1978, Vietnamese troops swept into Cambodia, driving out the Khmer Rouge and
establishing the People's Republic of Kampuchea ("PRK") in January of 1979. One immediate impact of
Vietnam's occupation was the large-scale influx of Cambodian refugees into Thailand. Hundreds of
thousands of these refugees were massed along the Thai-Cambodian border. By 1988, there were over
300,000 refugees in camps along the border serviced by international aid agencies. Id. at 5-7.
The Khmer Rouge has survived its expulsion from Cambodia due to a steady supply of arms from
Vietnam's traditional enemy, China. These arms were delivered to the Khmer Rouge by Thai forces who
wanted a buffer against the Vietnamese. Id.
54 Gordon Fairclough, New Frontiers, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 12, 1995, at 14. Between 1979 and
1991, the Thai army served as the main conduit for covert assistance to the Khmer Rouge. During that
time, it forged strong military ties with the Khmer Rouge who came to control valuable territory, including
the gem mines around Pailin and rich timber resources in Cambodia's northwest. Personal business deals
were struck between Thai army officers and the Khmer Rouge guerrillas to exploit these natural resources.
55 See Litherland, supra note 22.
56 Boutros-Ghali Says Japan Breaking Cambodian Log Ban, supra note 44.
57 Boutros-Ghali Says Japan Breaking Cambodian Log Ban, supra note 44.
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Company, was responsible for over half of the illegal imports, but was only
one of forty-six confirmed violations of the United Nations export ban. 58
Japan was the second largest offender after Thailand in violating the U.N.
imposed export ban. 59
Following the end of the UNTAC administration, Cambodia ended
the U.N. ban in order to allow the export of processed timber.60 By June of
1994, only the ban on the cutting of new timber remained.61 According to
the Cambodian Forestry Department, 300,625 cubic meters of round logs
and 166,378 cubic meters of sawn timber were legally exported in 1994.62
However, these figures do not include the Khmer Rouge's continued illegal
trade along the Thai-Cambodian border.63  Increasing deforestation
prompted the Cambodian government to reimpose a ban on all exports of
logs and sawn timber on May 1, 1995.64
The most recent export ban imposed by the Cambodian government
has also proven ineffective because of the ongoing civil war and the ever-
present demand for tropical timber.65 Because wood is the country's most
valuable resource, the group who controls the timber trade controls the
country's revenue. 66  Sam Rainsy, a former finance minister of the
Cambodian government states, "[w]e are no longer fighting a war over
ideologies. This is a war over who owns the wood. It is evident that many
military operations have been conducted to get control over timber or to
prevent the other side getting its hands on it first."'67
The Khmer Rouge controls ten percent of the country including
timber rich land in the northwest.68 It has been estimated that the Khmer
Rouge makes more than ten million dollars a month from the cross-border
sale of timber.69 Although the Thai government has banned all trade with
the Khmer Rouge, Thai logging firms have been accused of continuing to
58 Mitsui to Investigate Cambodia Timber Charge, JAPANECON, Feb. 17, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, JAPANECON Database.
59 Id.
60 See Litherland, supra note 22; for UNTAC, see supra note 48.61 Id.
62 Cambodia Bans Timber Exports, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May I, 1995.
63 Id
64 Id.
65 See Gray, supra note 18.
66 See Chain Saw Massacre Levels Cambodia's Forests, supra note 21.
67 Chain Saw Massacre Levels Cambodia's Forests, supra note 21.
68 See Chain Saw Massacre Levels Cambodia's Forests, supra note 21.
69 Chain Saw Massacre Levels Cambodia's Forests, supra note 2 1.
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work with the guerrillas in the cross-border timber trade.70 Thai firms help
fund the Khmer Rouge by paying "road taxes" to the guerrillas on timber
passing through Khmer-controlled areas on the way to Thailand.7 1
Additionally, the Khmer Rouge has been granting timber concessions to
Thai firms in Cambodia's timber rich northwest.72 These timber conces-
sions allow Thai firms to log more than fifteen million cubic meters for
periods of three to five years. 73 In one instance, documented in 1993, the
Khmer Rouge granted a contract to the Thai Government owned Forest
Industry Organization ("FIO") which allowed the FIO to extract one million
cubic meters of timber in exchange for royalty payments to the Khmer
Rouge of 2,500-3,000 Baht.74 This would yield the Khmer approximately
U.S. $100 million dollars in income over the contract's four year life. 75
Thai officials feel comfortable dealing with the Khmer partly because
of the discipline that the guerrillas maintain on the border zones and
because many of the guerrillas now speak Thai. 76 Additionally, these
concessions replace the slump in timber imports from Laos and Vietnam. 77
The illegal timber imports have also helped the Thai sawmill industry,
which is suffering from the Thai government's own logging ban that was
imposed in 1989.78
The high volume of timber proceeds flowing to the Khmer Rouge has
placed the Cambodian government in a difficult position. 79 The govern-
ment desperately needs foreign currency to fund its civil war and timber is
one of the few exports that continues to increase in value.8 0 Ironically, the
timber companies who purchased government concessions, before the most
recent export ban, were granted licenses in Khmer controlled areas.8 1 As a
result, these firms must also pay a "tax" to the Khmer on each log passing
70 Chain Saw Massacre Levels Cambodia's Forests, supra note 2 1.
71 Susan Litherland, Thailand-Cambodia: Bangkok Continues to Fund Khmer Rouge, Says NGO,
INTER PRESS SERV., June 8, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
72 Ken Stier, Log Rolling, Thai Forestry Contracts Help to fund Khmer Rouge. FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Jan. 21, 1993, at 15.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Andrew Nette, Environment-Cambodia: Log Export Ban Fails to Stop Forest Plunder, INTER
PRESS SERV., July 21, 1995, at 1, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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through Khmer Rouge territory, earning the guerrillas millions of dollars
monthly.8 2
Due to pressure to increase revenues, the Government is considering
an exception to its own export ban of May 1, 1995.83 The Cambodian
government is presently negotiating with Indonesia's Panin Group for a
logging concession which would give the Indonesian firm the right to log
3.7 million acres of Cambodia's dwindling forest cover.84
2. The Failure of Unilateral Import Bans
a. Malaysia's role
Exporting countries, such as Malaysia, have been critical of unilateral
attempts on the part of European countries to ban the import of tropical
timber.8 5  Timber is Malaysia's second biggest export earner after
petroleum.8 6 As of 1992, Malaysia accounted for two-thirds of the world
export of tropical logs.8 7 Like timber from most other Southeast Asian
countries, 8 8 most Malaysian timber is exported to Japan. 89
Logging in Malaysia is driven by a combination of power and
money. 90 Elected leaders in Malaysian provinces have the authority to
distribute timber contracts. 91  The distribution of timber contracts has
become a crucial part of the local political power base.92 Officials give
logging concessions to loyal supporters who level the forests for a quick
profit.93 These logging firms then give a payback to the official to help him
maintain his political office and to increase his wealth.94 Consequently,
logging, which has accounted for massive destruction and depletion of
82 Id.
83 Litherland, supra note 71.
84 Cambodia Negotiating Huge Logging Deal, S. F. CHRON., Aug. 28, 1995.
85 See Chase, supra note 12.
86 Malaysia Wants Market Access As Timber Rule Reward, JAPANECON, May i1, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, JAPANECON Database.
87 Kakuchi, supra note 47.
88 ld "
89 Malaysia Wants Market Access As Timber Rule Reward, supra note 86.
90 DURNING, supra note 1, at 40.
91 DURNING, supra note 1, at 40.
92 DURNING, supra note I, at 40.
93 DURNING, supra note I, at 40.
94 DURNING, supra note 1, at 40.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Malaysian forests, has mainly benefited those who are in positions of
power.9 5
b. Austria 's attempt to implement import restrictions on tropical timber
In the fear of losing export revenues, Malaysia has fought efforts to
limit the import of Malaysian timber.96 When Austria tried to implement
import restrictions on tropical timber, the legislation was immediately
challenged by Malaysia.97 In 1992, Austria's parliament introduced legis-
lation concerning the importation of tropical timber in reaction to domestic
pressure from environmental groups concerning global deforestation. 98 The
Austrian legislation that was originally introduced consisted of an import
tax on all products made from or containing tropical timber.99 The
legislation also contained a labeling law which would have mandated that
all tropical wood imports be labeled as "Made from Tropical Wood" or
"Contains Tropical Wood."100 Additionally, the legislation was to
implement an import certification system.' 0' The certification system was
to distinguish between products made from tropical timber harvested in a
sustainable fashion and products made from unsustainably harvested
timber. 102
In reaction to the Austrian legislation, Malaysia threatened to boycott
Austrian imports unless Austria revoked its import tariff and labeling
scheme.103 Presumably, Malaysia feared that other European Nations
would be prompted by domestic environmental groups to enact similar
legislation. Moreover, Malaysia felt that by banning tropical timber
imports, Austria was aiding its own market for temperate timber. 104
95 DURNING, supra note I, at 90.
96 See Chase, supra note 12.
97 See Chase, supra note 12.
98 See Chase, supra note 12, at 374-75.
99 Chase, supra note 12, at 375.
100 Chase, supra note 12, at 375. Under the import tax, the Economic Affairs Ministry was to
increase the import tax on all tropical wood products from eight percent to seventy percent. The revenue
generated from this ecological tax would then be donated to international environmental projects that
promote the sustainable harvesting of tropical forests. The Austrian authorities were to determine the
definition of "sustainable logging" and to determine which exporting countries complied with this
definition. See Chase, supra note 12, at 375, 376.
101 Chase, supra note 12, at 375.
102 Chase, supra note 12, at 376.
103 Malaysia Warns Swiss Not to Ban Tropical Wood Imports, supra note 37.
104 Chase, supra note 12, at 376-77. Austria produces 12 million cubic meters of temperate timber
products annually. Id.
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In addition to its threat of retaliation, Malaysia lodged a formal
protest with the GATT Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. 105
Malaysia alleged that the Austrian legislation constituted unfair trade
discrimination. Malaysia protested that Austria was attempting to decide
unilaterally what constituted a sustainably managed forest when there was
no international consensus on the issue. 106  Austria denied that its
legislation had a discriminatory intent. 107 However, Austria feared that its
regulations did violate the GATT108 and in December of 1992, the legisla-
ture abandoned the import tax.109 In return for the withdrawal of the import
tax, Malaysia withdrew its complaint before the GATT committee.11 0 The
Austrian government also agreed to further study the import-certification
measure in greater detail before implementation. The only piece of
Austrian legislation that remains in effect is the labeling law on tropical
wood products. I
c. The Netherlands Framework on Tropical Timber
The Netherlands, like Austria, attempted to implement import restric-
tions on tropical timber in 1993.112 The Netherlands is second only to
Japan in per capita consumption of tropical hardwood. 113 In reaction to
public pressure and the threat of a boycott against tropical timber products,
the Netherlands developed a plan to ban imports of timber from nonsustain-
ably managed forests.)' 4 The Netherlands Framework on Tropical Timber
("NFATT") was signed on June 25, 1993, by the Dutch government, asso-
ciations, and individual companies representing industry, business, unions,
and environmental organizations."l 5 The purpose of NFATT was to ensure
that all tropical timber imported for the Dutch market would consist of
105 Chase, supra note 12, at 376.
106 Chase, supra note 12, at 376.
107 Chase, supra note 12, at 377.
108 According to Chase. "[h]ence, while Austria's regulations appeared 'on their face' to be non-
discriminatory, in practice they represented a form of 'de facto' discrimination because they did not apply
to the 'like temperate timber products' of foreign or domestic producers." Chase, supra note 12, at 377.
109 See Chase, supra note 12, at 378.
110 Chase, supra note 12, at 378-79.
1l1 Chase, supra note 12, at 379.
112 See generally Netherlands' Framework Agreement on Tropical Timber, 25 June 1993
[hereinafter NFATT].
113 The Case of Tropical Timber in the Netherlands, Environmental Perspectives on Trade-
Environment Issues, EPOC High-Level Session, at 1, n. I (Paris, Dec. 7-8, 1993).
114 Id. at 2.
115 Id at3-4.
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sustainably produced tropical timber by 1995.116 Underlying the import
ban, "is the premise that trade in tropical timber can provide powerful
incentives for the achievement of sustainable forest management.""17
The NFATT seeks to provide consumers with reasonable guarantees
that the tropical timber they purchase comes from sustainably managed
forests while also providing producers with a reasonable expectation that
their higher-priced timber products will find adequate outlets."18
Additionally, NFATT allows producers to recover the additional costs
incurred through sustainable production. 119 Crucial to the implementation
of NFATT was the definition of sustainability and the way in which
sustainability would be determined in actual practice.120 "Sustainable forest
management" is defined in article 1 of the NFATT as "the process of
managing permanent forest land... without undue reduction of its inherent
values and future productivity of the forest and without undue undesirable
effects on the physical and social environment." 12 1  A group of experts
would be appointed to determine the relevant criteria and indicators that
could be tested, and standards and norms developed to further define
"sustainable forest management." 122
The Dutch plan, although intended as a model for the international
community,123 was dropped by the Dutch government in December of
1994.124 When the government presented the NFATT to the International
116 Id. at3.
117 ld. at 4.
118 Id.
119 Id
120 Id. at 7.
121 NFATT, supranote 112, art. 1.
122 NFATT. supra note 112, art. 4(b)(3)(1). The NFATr consists of a three-phased plan of action.
The first phase, the Development and Exploration Phase, was instituted in 1993. In this phase, the
following issues were addressed: (1) collecting and analyzing all information relevant to the Dutch tropical
timber market; (2) developing the method used to measure sustainably produced timber; (3) negotiating
bilateral agreements with the timber producing countries on cooperation in the marketing and processing of
sustainably produced timber; and (4) developing a blueprint for a certification system to provide consumers
with appropriate information about sustainably produced timber. The Case of Tropical Timber in the
Netherlands, supra note 113, at 5.
For the second phase, the Experimental Phase originally projected for 1994, a system was to be
created to enable consumers to identify sustainably produced timber. At the Implementation phase, which
was scheduled to begin in 1995, the tropical timber trade, processing and retail companies should be in a
position to acquire, process, and trade sustainably produced timber. Additionally, consumers should be
aware of and be able to identify the benefits of sustainably produced timber. The Case of Tropical Timber
in the Netherlands, supra note 113, at 5.
123 See The Case of Tropical Timber in the Netherlands, supra note 113, at 6.
124 Dutch Drop Planned Ban on Nonsustainable Timber Imports, Environmental Watch Western
Europe, Dec. 16, 1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
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Tropical Timber Council during its Fifteenth Session (Yokohama, Japan,
November 1993), the Dutch document was sharply criticized. 125 One of the
complaints was that the Netherlands was too far ahead of the rest of the
international community in determining a target year for "sustainability."1 26
Instead of the import ban, the Dutch government now plans to develop,
together with producer countries, a voluntary "ecolabel" for sustainably
produced timber by the year 2000.127 The Dutch government felt that it
would have had a difficult time implementing its own importation system
while other countries lacked similar importation procedures. 128
d The Failure of unilateral import and export bans under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The failure of the Austrian import restrictions demonstrate how
unilateral efforts have come into conflict with the GATT. The two GATT
articles most often referred to when discussing environmental protection are
articles III and XX.129 Article III, on national treatment, allows countries to
establish regulations to protect their environment from damage caused by
domestic production activities or the importation of foreign goods.130 The
problem with unilateral import and export restrictions is that although they
are implemented for the protection of a nation's environment, they often
discriminate against foreign products in contravention of the GATT.131 For
example, timber import bans usually discriminate between tropical and non-
tropical timber.132 Thus, when a country such as Austria implements an
import ban, the foreign supplier of tropical timber (e.g., Malaysia) is
discriminated against, thus giving the domestic supplier of temperate timber
an unfair advantage. 133
The Dutch Agreement would have had the same conflict with the
GATT because the Netherlands, an importer of tropical timber, is also a
125 The Case of Tropical Timber in the Netherlands, supra note 113, at 6.
126 The Case of Tropical Timber in the Netherlands, supra note 113, at 6.
127 Dutch Drop Planned Ban on Nonsustainable Timber Imports, supra note 124. An ecolabel is
used to determine whether the certified timber was harvested in a sustainable manner.
128 Dutch Drop Planned Ban on Nonsustainable Timber Imports, supra note 124.
129 PAR HALLSTROM, THE GATT PANELS AND THE FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 89
(1994?30 Id. See GATT, supra note 17, art. 3.
13! See Chase, supra note 12, at 383.
132 Chase, supra note 12, at 383.
133 Chase, supra note 12, at 383.
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timber producing country. 134 Similar to Austria, the Netherlands produces
temperate timber for domestic use. 135 Therefore, the Dutch restrictions
would have been seen by a GATT panel as aiding the Dutch domestic
timber industry and discriminating against foreign trade. Additionally,
import restrictions on tropical timber are generally processed-based, and
processed-based distinctions are prohibited under GATT.136
Article III also prohibits export restrictions that protect a domestic
industry.137 Because exporting countries do not generally place the same
limitations on the domestic consumption of their forests, the export
restrictions favor domestic processing of timber products. 138 Cambodia's
unilateral export ban is probably inconsistent with the GATT because
Cambodia has not enacted a similar restriction on the cutting of tropical
timber for domestic use. 139
Additionally, for unilateral bans to be consistent with the GATT they
must be "necessary" as defined in article XX(I)(b). 140 According to recent
GATT panels, the relevant inquiry is whether a measure is "necessary to
protect human, animal, plant life or health."'14 1 A measure is "unnecessary"
if other means are available which are consistent with the GATT. 142 One
GATT panel held that in order for a country to invoke an exception under
article XX, it must exhaust all other reasonable alternatives including
attempting multilateral negotiations. 143 Scientific authorities often differ as
to when a trade ban is necessary to protect the plant life of a country. Thus,
it will often be difficult to for a country to show that a measure is necessary
under the GATT.
134 See Chase, supra note 12, at 383; see Judith Perera & David Dahmen, Environment-Trade:
Timber Trade Certificates No Easy Answer. INTER PRESS SERV., May 26, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS Database.
135 See Perera & Dahmen, supra note 134; Chase, supra note 12, at 354.
136 Chase, supra note 12, at 383-84. For a discussion of process-based distinctions, see also id. at
385-87.
137 Chase, supra note 12, at 380. See GATT, supra note 17, art. 3.
138 See Chase, supra note 12, at 380.
139 See Nette, supra note 79.
140 GATT, supra note 17, art. XX()(b). General Exceptions permits countries to implement
measures (b) necessary to protect animal or plant life or health, or (g) measures relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources as long as such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on the country's domestic production or consumption
141 Chase, supra note 12, at 384.
142 Chase, supra note 12, at 384.
143 Chase, supra note 12, at 385.
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B. International Efforts To Protect Tropical Timber
An international solution to the problem of controlling the tropical
timber trade is necessary for two reasons. First, as detailed above, unilateral
trade restrictions are often prohibited by the GATT and second, individual
countries cannot control trade without help from the international
community. However, the existing international conventions that affect the
tropical timber trade, the International Tropical Timber Agreement and the
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species, have failed to
adequately monitor the export and import of tropical timber.
1. The International Tropical Timber Organization
In recognition of the need for better conservation and development of
tropical timber resources, 144 the United Nations Conference on Tropical
Timber concluded the International Tropical Timber Agreement ("ITTA")
in 1983.145 The ITTA was the first international commodity agreement to
specifically include provisions addressing conservation.14 6 The original
1983 Agreement emphasized the importance of sustainable use of tropical
timberl 47 resources and sought to foster cooperation in sustainable trade of
144 International Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 25, 1983, U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER/I I pmbl.
145 U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER/I 1, supra note 144, art. 1. The ITTA was negotiated and adopted by
36 timber producing countries and by 33 timber consuming countries. The timber-producing countries are
Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Malaysia,
Mexico, Myanmar, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, United Republic of
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad, Tobago, Venezuela, and Zaire. ITTA, supra note 14, at 1042 annex
A.
The timber-consuming countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain. Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, European Community (Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and, United Kingdom), Finland, Japan, Nepal, New
Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
States of America. ITTA, supra note 14, at 1042 annex B. The ITTA established the International
Tropical Timber Organization ("ITTO") to administer the provisions and supervise the operations of the
ITTA. In turn, the ITTO answers to the International Tropical Timber Council ("iTTC"), which is
comprised of the countries that signed the Agreement. U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER/! I, supra note 144, art. 3.
146 Robert M. Hardaway et al., Tropical Forest Conservation Legislation and Policy: A Global
Perspective, 15 WHITTIER L. REv. 919, 948 (1994).
147 For the purposes of the Agreement, "tropical timber" was defined as "non-coniferous tropical
wood for industrial uses, which grows or is produced in the countries situated between the Tropic of
Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn." U.N. Doc: TD/TIMBER/I 1, supra note 144, pmbl. & art. 2.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
tropical timber.14 8 However, the IITO has proven completely ineffective in
regulating the timber trade.149
As to Cambodia, the ITTO has been of little assistance because of its
stance on trade restrictions. 150 The ITTO has vigorously argued against
unilateral trade bans. 15 1 According to the ITTO, one main value of tropical
forests is as earners of foreign exchange. 152 The ITTO's argument is that as
the timber trade in a country is reduced, the international community will
have less influence in policies and development regarding tropical
forests. 153
In contrast to the situation in Cambodia, the ITTO has been more
willing to address the problem of deforestation in Malaysia.154 Tropical
forest destruction in Sarawak has received worldwide attention and in 1989,
the ITTO sent an investigative mission to Sarawak to assess the sustainable
use of tropical forests in the region.155 Although the mission found ample
evidence of poor logging management and practice, the ITTO failed to take
action against Malaysia. 5 6 In 1990, Sarawak commissioned the ITTO to
draw up recommendations for preserving its remaining forests. 157 The
ITTO recommended that the cutting level not exceed nine point two million
cubic meters a year. 158 Because Sarawak had failed to bring its logging rate
down to the recommended level, the ITTO pledged four million dollars to
finance projects which promote sustainable harvesting of timber. 159
The failure of the IT7O to take stronger action against Malaysia, is
partly due to the much criticized way in which votes are designated in the
ITTO. 160 Under the ITTA, votes are divided equally between consumers in
the developed world and exporters of tropical timber in the developing
world.161 Consumer states receive a certain number of votes based on their
148 Hardaway et al., supra note 146, at 948. For provisions that reflect the importance of
sustainable use of tropical timber resources, see U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER/I 1, supra note 144, art. 1(h).
149 Hardaway et al., supra note 146, at 949.
150 Marcus Colchester, The International Tropical Timber Organization: Kill or Cure for the
Rainforests?, 20 THE ECOLOGIST 166, 170 (1990).
151 Id
152 Id
153 Id.
154 Id at 171.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 172.
157 Logging Cuts Cost Malaysian State 50 Million Dollars Yearly, supra note 36.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Colchester, supra note 150, at 167.
161 ITTA, supra note 14, art. 10 (1).
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consumption of tropical timber. 162 For example, Japan has the most votes
of any consumer country because it is the largest importer of tropical
timber. 163 Similarly, exporter countries receive votes proportional to the
amount of timber that they export. 164 On the producer side, Indonesia has
the most votes followed by Malaysia and Brazil.165 The result of this voting
system is that the more a country contributes to deforestation, the more
votes it receives in the ITTO. 166 This voting structure "ensures that the
ITTO's primary role of promoting the timber trade heavily outweighs its
secondary conservation role."' 167
The ITTO has the impossible task of both conserving tropical timber
resources and promoting the tropical timber trade.168  The aim of
conservation is additionally undermined by the fact that the ITTA does not
contain a system to determine whether a country is harvesting tropical
timber in a "sustainable" manner. 169 In 1990, at its annual meeting in Bali,
the ITTO announced its goal of deriving all tropical timber from sustainable
resources by the year 2000.170 While this is a laudable goal, there is no
consensus in the ITTO or the international community as to what
"sustainable" means. 17 1 Moreover, the ITIA has failed to implement regu-
lations on the trade of unsustainably managed timber. 172
162 ITTA, supra note 14, art. 10(5).
163 1TTA, supra note 14, annex B.
164 ITTA, supra note 14, art. 10 (2)(b).
165 ITTA, supra note 14, annex A.
166 Colchester, supra note 150, at 167.
167 Colchester, supra note 150, at 167.
168 Colchester, supra note 150, at 166.
169 One of the objectives of the original ITTA is "[t]o encourage the development of national
policies aimed at sustainable utilization and conservation of tropical forests and their genetic resources, and
at maintaining the ecological balance in the regions concerned." lITA, supra note 14, art. 1(h). However,
nowhere does the ITTA define what "sustainable" actually means.
170 The most recent Agreement of January 26, 1994, stresses the importance of meeting the year
2000 goal. See ITTA, supra note 14, pmbl. Malaysia reacted critically to the goals set by the International
Tropical Timber Organization ("ITTO"). ITTO members have set the year 2000 as the deadline for all
tropical timber products to be logged on a sustainable basis to prevent further deforestation around the
globe. In reaction, the Malaysian Prime Minister declared that producer countries be compensated, in the
form of free market access and incentives, for the loss in revenue these environmental protections would
create once sustainable logging becomes compulsory. Malaysia Wants Market Access as Timber Rule
Reward, JAPANECON, May 11, 1993, available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON Database.
171 Chase, supra note 12, at 371.
172 Colchester, supra note 150, at 169.
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2. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
In addition to the ITTA, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES")173 also affects the
tropical timber trade. The appendices of CITES enumerate threatened
species. 74 The most restrictive list is appendix I which covers species that
are threatened by extinction and are or may be affected by trade. 175
International trade in appendix I species is forbidden with certain narrow
exceptions. 176 International transactions in appendix I species require an
export permit from the country where the wildlife originates or a re-export
certificate from the re-exporting country. 177 An import permit is also
required from the recipient country. 178 In order for a species to be listed
under appendix I, two criteria must be met: the species at issue must (1) be
threatened with extinction 179 and (2) be potentially affected by international
trade. 18 0
Appendix II of CITES regulates the trade in wildlife that is not
currently threatened with extinction but may become so if trade .is not
controlled.18 ' Commercial trade is permitted in appendix II listed species,
provided that the country of origin or country of re-export has issued an
export permit or re-export certificate. 182 However, unlike appendix I, an
import certificate from the country of origin is not required.' 8 3 Appendix II,
173 CITES was signed in Washington, D.C., on March 3, 1973, and entered into force in July 1975.
CITES is the only global treaty that aims to regulate trade in endangered species of flora and fauna. CITES
signatories are -obligated to monitor the global wildlife trade and to take action on behalf of species
endangered because of international trade. INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: A CITES SOURCEBOOK I
(Ginette Hemley ed., 1994). For a full discussion of all the elements of the treaty, see S. LYSTER,
INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 239-77 (1985).
174 See CITES, supra note 15.
175 INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: A CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 173, at I.
176 Noncommercial trade in these species is only allowed in exceptional circumstances, such as for
scientific or zoological purposes and if such trade will not jeopardize the species chance for survival.
INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: A CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 173, at 3. See CITES, supra note
15, art. Ill.
177 CITES, supra note 15, art. 111(3).
178 CITES, supra note 15, art. 111(3).
179 The word extinction is commonly referred to as the elimination of all living specimens of a
particular species. However, extinction does not necessarily mean the total worldwide elimination of a
species. The threat of extinction in a specific geographic location or to a subspecies population is
sufficient. DAVID S. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES 31 (1989).
180 CITES, supra note 15, art. II(1).
181 INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: A CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 173, at 4.
182 CITES, supra note 15, art. IV.
183 CITES, supra note 15, art. IV. Appendix II also includes look-alike species that are not already
threatened with extinction but may become so if trade is not controlled. An entire genus, family, or order
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which contains tens of thousands of species, is much larger than appendix
1.184 This is a consequence of the parties' tendency to list individual species
in appendix I and whole families in appendix 11.185 Finally, appendix III is
for nations to list species endangered within their own borders.18 6
CITES has been praised as the most successful of all international
treaties concerned with the conservation of wildlife. 8 7 However, CITES
has not been as successful in protecting plants. 8 8 This ineffectiveness is
due to a number of factors including a lack of interest of most of the parties,
for which trade in plants from an economic point of view is less important
than trade in animals and their parts and derivatives. 189 Other issues
affecting the regulation of the endangered plant trade are more technical in
nature. 190 The identification of plant specimens is in most cases even more
difficult than for animals and their parts and derivatives. 19 1 For example, it
is difficult to distinguish between some types of tropical trees and to
determine whether a plant was artificially propagated.192
Currently, CITES lists only three species of tropical timber, the
Brazilian rosewood listed under appendix I and the Mexican mahogany and
Caribbean mahogany listed under appendix II.193 One possibility for
controlling the tropical timber trade is to include more species of tropical
timber in Appendices I and II of CITES.
However, problems exist as to listing tropical timber that is
threatened with deforestation in Cambodia and Malaysia. CITES is not a
habitat protection treaty. Although important as habitats for both plant and
may be listed if most species within the group are threatened and if it is difficult to distinguish between
threatened and nonthreatened species. INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: A CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 173, at4.
184 LYSTER, supra note 173, at 245. See CITES, supra note 15, apps. 1, lI.
185 LYSTER, supra note 173, at 245.
186 INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: A CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 173, at 4. Appendix III
allows parties the option of listing native species that are already protected within their own borders. The
objective of appendix III is to provide a mechanism whereby a Party that domestically regulates the export
of species not listed in appendix I or II can seek international help in enforcing its legislation. LYSTER,
supra note 173, at 246.
187 LYSTER, supra note 173, at 240.
188 WILLEM WIJNSTEKERS, THE EVOLUTION OF CITES: A REFERENCE TO THE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA 233 (1992).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id
192 See id.
193 See CITES, supra note 15, apps. I, Ii. The Mexican Mahogany is listed under its scientific
name, Swietenia humilis; the Caribbean Mahogany as Swietenia mahagoni; and the Brazilian rosewood as
Dalbergia nigra. INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: A CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 173, at 83, 103.
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animal wildlife, forests are not protected by CITES because they are not
considered threatened as a whole. Generally under CITES, the broader a
category of plants or animals is, the less likely it is to qualify as being
endangered or threatened with extinction. 194 Conversely, the smaller and
more localized a population is, the greater chance it will have to qualify as
endangered. 195 In regard to tropical forests, CITES protects only individual
species that are themselves threatened by trade, such as the Brazilian
rosewood. 196
Although the size of Cambodia's tropical forests has diminished over
thirty percent in the last thirty years, 197 the individual species that make up
the Cambodian tropical forest are not technically threatened. In order for
Cambodian tropical timber to be listed in appendix I, the separate species of
tropical trees would have to be threatened with extinction and be potentially
affected by trade. The most popular species of tropical timber exported
from Southeast Asia comes from the Dipterocarp family which makes up a
large portion of forests in the region. 198 Since species from the Dipterocarp
family are abundant in Southeast Asia, they are unlikely to be viewed as
endangered. Overall, CITES presents an inadequate framework for
protecting tropical timber species.
IV. REGULATING THE TROPICAL TIMBER TRADE WITH A NEW TIMBER
CONVENTION
Neither CITES nor the ITTA provides an adequate response to the
problem of regulating the tropical timber trade nor do these agreements go
far enough in monitoring the tropical timber trade. A new agreement is
necessary to establish an international framework for countries to truly
comply with international restrictions on the tropical timber trade. A new
agreement should employ the "prior informed consent" framework of the
Basel Convention to create mutually supportive import and export
restrictions.
194 David S. Favre, Tension Points Within the Language of the CITES Treaty, 5 B.U. INT'L L. J.
247, 249 (1987).
195 Id.
196 CITES, supra note 15, app. 1.
197 Government Announces Ban on Log Exports as Part of Effort to Reduce Deforestation, supra
note 10.
198 THE JAPANESE MARKET FOR TROPICAL TIMBER: AN ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
TROPICAL TIMBER ORGANIZATION X-3 (1990).
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A. The Basel Convention
A new regime for the control of the tropical timber trade must
establish uniform international obligations and standards. This, in principle,
was the approach taken by the Basel Convention in controlling the interna-
tional hazardous waste trade. 199 The Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal was
adopted in 1989 under the auspices of the United Nations Environment
Program.200 The Convention entered into force on May 6, 1992, and consti-
tuted the first attempt at global regulation of the international transport of
hazardous waste.201 Importantly, the elaboration of the Basel Convention
was seen by many as an opportunity to stop the illegal international waste
traffic. 202
Like CITES, the Basel Convention is based on import and export
restrictions. 203  The export of wastes to any developing country is
prohibited if the importing party has prohibited all imports by legislation,
has not given its prior informed consent, or if the exporting party has reason
to believe that the wastes in question will not be managed in an environ-
mentally sound manner.2 04 The Convention also places an affirmative duty
upon an importing country to prevent the import of hazardous wastes if the
waste will not be managed safely.205 Furthermore, hazardous wastes are
required to be accompanied by a document of movement from the point at
which transboundary movement begins to the point of disposal. 206 The
Basel Convention prohibits parties to the Convention from exporting or
199 Katharina Kummer, The International Regulation of Transboundary Traffic in Hazardous
Wastes: The 1989 Basel Convention, 41 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 530, 532 (1992).
200 Basel Convention, supra note 16, pmbl.
201 Diana L. Godwin, Comment, The Basel Convention on Tranboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes: An Opportunity for Industrialized Nations to Clean Up Their Acts?, 22 DENY. J. OF
INT'L L. & POL'Y 193, 199 (1993).
202 Kummer, supra note 199, at 535. One hundred and five States and the European Union have
signed the Final Act of the Basel Convention. The five main goals of the convention are: (1) minimize the
generation of hazardous waste; (2) reduce transboundary movements of hazardous waste; (3) achieve
national self-sufficiency in waste disposal; (4) create a system of prior notification and informed consent
between importing and exporting countries; and (5) ban the movement of hazardous waste between parties
and non-parties to the Convention in the absence of some other agreement. Mark E. Allen, Comment,
Slowing Europe's Hazardous Waste Trade: Implementing the Basel Convention into European Union Law,
6 COLO. J. INT'L & ENvT'L L. & POL'Y 163, 166 (1995).
203 See Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 4.
204 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 4(2Xe).
205 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 4 (2Xg).
206 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 4(7Xc).
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importing hazardous waste from a nonparty state.207 However, parties may
enter into bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements regarding the
transport of hazardous wastes provided that such agreements do not
derogate from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes
required by the Convention.208
In order to implement the import and export restrictions, the
Convention has created a system of "prior informed consent" 209 whereby,
the state of export must notify the state of import of any intended movement
of hazardous waste.2 10 The information provided must be sufficiently
detailed to enable the importing state to assess the nature and risk of the
intended movement of hazardous waste.211 The state of import must then
respond to the notifier in writing, consenting to the movement with or
without conditions, denying permission for the movement, or requesting
additional information.2 12 The state of export may not allow the trans-
boundary movement to commence until it has received written
confirmation 2 13 of the written consent of the state of import,2 14 and confir-
mation of the existence of a contract between the exporter and the disposer
specifying environmentally sound management of the wastes in question. 2 15
The Basel Convention presents a practical framework for creating a
system of export and import restrictions to control the international tropical
timber trade. In applying the Basel Convention framework, the import of
tropical timber from: a developing country would be prohibited if the
exporting country had prohibited all exports by legislation or if the
importing country had reason to believe that the timber in question was not
harvested in a sustainable manner. The definition of "sustainable" would be
determined collectively by parties to the Convention at their first
meeting.2 16 As in the Netherlands Framework on Tropical Timber, an
207 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 4(5).
208 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. II.
209 Kummer, supra note 199, at 547. See Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6.
210 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(I).
211 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(l), annex V (lists the information to be specified).
212 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(2).
213 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(3).
214 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(3)(a).
215 Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(3)(b).
216 The World Wildlife Fund considers a "sustainably managed" forest to be one that is without
"significant ecological impoverishment." Colchester, supra note 150, at 167. Another definition made
popular by the Brundtland Commission considers "the means by which development is made to meet the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Id.
In terms of tropical forests, sustainability would include not just preserving timber resources, but also
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international task force of experts could be assigned the role of determining
the criteria necessary to establish that a forest is sustainably managed.
The system of "prior informed consent" would be a necessary part of
any scheme to regulate the timber trade. The state of import would have to
notify the state of export that it wished to import tropical timber.217 The
state of export would then be required to respond to the importer in writing,
indicating whether it granted or denied permission.218 Furthermore, the
state of import would be prohibited from receiving timber until it had
received written confirmation of the consent of the state of export.2 19
Finally, the timber convention would prohibit parties to the Convention
from importing or exporting tropical timber from a non-party. 220
An affirmative duty must be placed on the exporting country to
prevent the illegal export of tropical timber. Nations would have to take the
appropriate legal and administrative measures to implement and enforce the
provisions of the Convention. 221 This would include enacting measures to
prevent and punish the illegal smuggling of timber.
A new timber convention would bolster the sovereignty of exporting
countries by banning imports of timber from exporting countries which
prohibit the export of tropical timber. In the case of Cambodia, the country
would have to make an effort to reduce the illegal smuggling of timber by
the Khmer Rouge; and Cambodia would have to take the appropriate legal
measures to enforce its prohibition. Under this framework, Japan and
Thailand would be prohibited from purchasing any timber that originated in
Cambodia. International pressure on consuming countries to abide by the
treaty would extinguish the Khmer Rouge's illegal market, and Thailand
and Japan would be subject to international scrutiny for any illegal
importation of tropical timber. But with international monitoring, the
illegal trade should be stopped at the border. Essential for this scheme is
that tropical timber be accompanied by a movement document designating
the point of origin, as provided for in the Basel Convention. 222
maintaining biological diversity and preserving the ecological functions of forests. This includes
preserving soil quality, climate and weather cycles, and downstream fisheries. Id. at 168.
217 See Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(1).
218 See Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(2).
219 See Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(3).
220 See Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 4(5).
221 See Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 4(l).
222 See Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 4(7)(c).
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In order to enforce the convention, the Secretariat must be required to
take a more direct role in the monitoring of the tropical timber trade.223 As
it stands now, Cambodia cannot report violations of its export bans to any
competent international environmental tribunal. In order to focus on trouble
spots, the Secretariat could make an assessment of those tropical countries
(such as Cambodia) that required enhanced monitoring on the border of the
country. To facilitate the deterrence of illegal trade, all copies of import
notifications would be sent to the Secretariat to allow for the centralized
monitoring of the tropical timber trade. Additionally, by enacting strong
penalties for violators and by monitoring companies involved in the tropical
timber trade more closely, better accounting would take place of log
exports.224
Consequently, if Malaysia wanted to export timber without
restrictions, it would be free to do so without fear of international
retaliation. However, if Malaysia failed to manage her forests in a
sustainable manner, parties to the timber convention would be free to
choose not to import timber from Malaysia. A new multilateral timber
agreement would allow Malaysia a voice which it might not have if Western
European countries enacted their own import bans. As is evidenced from
the Austrian and Dutch efforts to limit tropical timber imports, Malaysia has
been faced with the trend towards tropical timber regulation. Especially in
Southeast Asia, where trade in hardwood timber is an important source of
income,225 an international solution is needed that respects Malaysia's
sovereignty yet places equal responsibility on importing and exporting
countries to control the tropical timber trade.
The convention will be appealing to the exporting countries which
want to limit their exports and to importing countries which want to limit
their imports. The convention would prohibit parties from importing or
exporting tropical timber from a non-party so that countries party to the
agreement, including probably the exporting countries of Southeast Asia
and the importing countries of Western Europe, would be forbidden from
223 David J. Abrams, Note, Regulating the International Hazardous Waste Trade: A Proposed
Global Solution, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 831 (1990). The Secretariat created by the Basel
Convention was given primarily information-gathering and transmitting powers. The Convention merely
authorizes the Secretariat to provide parties with the names of private consultants with the necessary
technical expertise to assist in assessing notification documents, to verify that the waste shipment as
received matches its documentation and to determine whether the hazardous waste will be managed in an
environmentally sound manner. Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 16(l)(h).
224 Abrams, supra note 223, at 834-35.
225 BERGER, supra note 46, at 205.
VOL. 5 No. 2
MARCH 1996 DEFORESTATION IN CAMBODIA AND MALAYSIA
trading timber with a non-party such as Japan. The success of a new timber
agreement hinges to a large degree on Japan's willingness to be a party.
One way to encourage Japan to sign would be to guarantee to Japan a
percentage of sustainably harvested timber imports. Additionally, Japan, as
a party to the convention, only has to agree to respect the export bans of
countries that enact such legislation.
A scheme based on the Basel Convention would shift the timber trade
situation from one involving unilateral export or import bans, to one
involving mutually supportive import and export bans. This multilateral
scheme creates a plausible compromise between countries such as
Cambodia that want to stop the export of its timber and countries such as
Malaysia that want to retain sovereignty over their natural resources.
B. The Importance of a Multilateral Solution
In order to solve the problem of the tropical timber trade, a
multilateral agreement is essential. The advantages of a multilateral
solution are that an international agreement is more effective than unilateral
efforts and a multilateral solution is necessary to overcome obstacles
created by the GATT and the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 226
When the WTO and its accompanying agreements came into force on
January 2, 1995, it was unclear what effect they would have on international
environmental restrictions. 227 The intent behind the establishment of the
WTO was further trade liberalization through the removal of remaining
barriers to free trade.228 The structure of the WTO facilitates this goal by
extending the institutional capacity of the GATT.229 This extension of trade
liberalization caused concern among environmental groups230 due to the
226 GATT Secretartiat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, GATT Doc.
MTN/FA, 33 I.L.M. 1125, arts. I-Ill. The WTO was created under The Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The WTO was implemented to develop a more
viable international trading system and to overcome the GATT's organizational short comings. The WTO
unifies the new and existing GATT obligations under one administrative roof and provides an
internationally recognized organizational structure. Under the WTO agreement, the WTO is authorized to
implement the Uruguay Round Agreements (the Multilateral and Plurilateral Trade Agreements) and to
resolve disputes arising out of the Uruguay Round Agreements.
227 Jennifer Schultz, The GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment-Toward
Environmental Reform, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 423 (1995).
228 Id. at 424.
229 Id. at 425.
230 Id.
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lack of a serious commitment in the text of the WTO to the goal of envi-
ronmentally sustainable development. 23 1 However, there are indications
that International Environmental Agreements ("IEAs") may prove an
exception in the prohibitions against using trade restrictions for environ-
mental protection.
Clearly, unilateral trade restrictions often come into conflict with the
GATT;232 however, the GATT does not necessarily present an obstacle to
internationally agreed trade restrictions on tropical timber.233 In 1991, the
GATT reactivated its Working Group on Environmental Measures and
International Trade ("EMIT") 234 to consider whether IEAs violated the
GATT.235 The EMIT did not give a definitive answer because current
GATT rules do not explicitly address IEAs. 236 However, commentators
have suggested that the GATT should be amended to allow countries to
impose trade measures for environmental purposes only when those
measures are "related to" an IEA.237
Although "related to" has also not been clearly defined,238 imposing
trade restrictions is certainly "related to" and even necessary for an IEA
which focuses on controlling the tropical timber trade in order to stem
deforestation. The creation of the Committee on Trade and the
Environment by the WTO adds support for reconciling GATT restrictions
with IEAs.239 The creation of this committee demonstrates the WTO's
commitment to resolving conflicts between environmental regulations and
the GATT.240
There is no consensus regarding the effects of the GATT/WTO on
IEAs. However, multilateral agreements appear to be able to withstand
GATT challenges. 24 1 According to the 1994 report of the Office of the U.S.
231 Id.
232 See NFATT discussion supra Part III.A.2.c.
233 Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS: REPORT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, August 1994, available in WESTLAW, GATT Database, 1994 WL 761804.
234 The purpose of EMIT was to focus on the following three issues: (1) the relationship between
trade provisions in existing international environmental agreements ("IEAs") and GATT principles; (2) the
"transparency" of national environmental regulations likely to have trade effects; and (3) the trade effects
of packaging and labeling requirements aimed at protecting the environment. Id § 1l(B).
236 Id.
236 Id. § VI(2)(a).237 Id. § Vl(2)(d).
238 Id.
239 Schultz, supra note 227, at 425-26.
240 Schultz, supra note 227, at 425.
241 Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 233, § VI(c).
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Trade Representative, the Uruguay Round should not pose a threat to future
IEAs:242
[A]s the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment seeks
for ways to ensure that international trade rules do not conflict
with international environmental objectives, it is likely that
nations will place increased emphasis on international coop-
erative efforts on the environment as a means of avoiding trade
conflicts over these issues. 24 3
A final consideration regarding the GATT and lEAs is the last-in-
time rule of international law.244 For example it has been suggested that,
when there are parties to both agreements, the Basel Convention of 1989
trumps the GATT of 1947 by virtue of the last-in-time rule.245 However, it
may be that the 1994 GATT/WTO agreement defeats such trumping,
because it resets GATT's date to 1994, permitting it to leapfrog over
existing environmental treaties that use trade measures. 246 But in the case
of a new tropical timber agreement, the GATT would be trumped again by
the last-in-time rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of deforestation in Cambodia and Malaysia requires an
international legal solution. The existing legal mechanisms have failed on
both the national and international level to protect tropical timber. A multi-
lateral trade agreement would provide the necessary trade restrictions at
both the place of import and place of export by using the "prior informed
consent" framework of the Basel Convention. Deforestation in Southeast
Asia is a global problem requiring more effort on the part of importing and
exporting countries alike to ensure the future existence of the world's
tropical forests.
242 Id.
243 Id
244 Schultz, supra note 227, at 434. The last-in-time rule is applied in the following manner: when
the provisions of two treaties conflict, the later in time prevails, as between parties to both treaties, unless
one treaty expressly specifies otherwise. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
245 Schultz, supra note 227, at 434.
246 Schultz, supra note 227, at 434.

